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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE UNITED STA TES OF 
AMERICA, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
COLOMBINE COAL COMP ANY, a 
Utah corporation; LAURA S. 
MONAY; WALKER BANK & 
TRUST COMP ANY, a corporation; 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
P ANY, Administrator of the Estate 
of Frank V. Colombo, deceased; 
CARBON COUNTY, a body corpor-
ate and politic of the State of Utah; 
BERT L. PRICHARD and STAND-
ARD METALS CORPORATION, 
Defendants - Appellants 
Case No. 
12459 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent United States of America, hereinafter 
called "the Government," agrees with appellants' state-
ment as to the nature of the case, save and except that the 
appellants interposed, as one of several defenses, that 
1 
....., 
monies received from insurance on the life of Dr. Colom. 
ho should have been applied on the Colombine ARA loan 
as directed by appellants. ' 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent agrees with the statement of appellants 
as to the disposition of this case by the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The trial court's Findings of Fact 12 and 13 in plain. 
tiff's First Cause of Action with relation to the default on 
the $325,000 loan are sustained by the evidence, and this 
court should so hold. It should also be noted that appel· 
!ants admit no error was committed by the trial court in 
entering its judgment and decree with relation to the 
$100,000 SBA loan. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For this court to more fully understand the Govern· 
ment's position in this appeal, additional facts should be 
made available to the court in considering its decision 
herein. 
Colombine Coal Company was a closely-held cor· 
poration managed, in the main, by Dr. Colombo. Its oper· 
ation was never a financial success, mainly for the reason 
of poor management and being operated at all times with· 
out adequate working capital (Tr. 67-135-136-191-202). 
Before Dr. Colombo's death in February of 1969, he had 
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received a commitment from Walker Bank and Trust 
Company of Price, Utah for an additional loan of $25,000, 
conditioned on his first obtaining a loan in the amount 
of $30,000 from Bartek Corporation in Miami, Florida, 
to which corporation all of Colombo's stock had been 
transferred. Due to Dr. Colombo's death, these loans 
were never obtained (Tr. 135-136-141-142), and, as a re-
sult, the stock of Colombine Coal Company was placed 
in escrow with the Commercial Security Bank of Salt Lake 
City, Utah pursuant to a Contract of Sale of the Colom-
bine stock to one Sabil Corporation and conditioned, 
among other things, that the ARA and SBA loans be 
brought immediately current by Sabil (Tr. 142-143-144); 
that upon the death of Dr. Colombo the Government 
made demand upon the John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Company for payment of insurance upon the life 
of Dr. Colombo, the policy of which was given as collat-
eral for payment of the ARA $325,000 loan. 
An attorney by the name of Chester Abney of Miami, 
Florida, reported to represent both Colombine, Bartek, 
and Sabil Corporations (Tr. 123-138-162-163), made de-
mand upon the said insurance company that the proceeds 
from the said life insurance policy should be paid to him 
in the capacity as such attorney and, as a result of 'iaid 
demands, the payment on the life insurance policy was 
deferred from February 1969 until January 1970 (Tr. 
133-134-148), at which time the proceeds were paid to the 
Government and an entry record made of the payment 
of said insurance proceeds in the amount of $79,226.83 
on January 15, 1970, Exhibit e:;:t. Between the date 
F-1 
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of Dr. Colombo's death and the date of the accelerations 
of the ARA and SBA loans, in December 1969 contacts 
were made with field offices of the SBA in Texas, Salt 
Lake City and Denver, who serviced both loans, with a 
request that the insurance money be applied on the front 
end of both loans (Tr. 125-126-127). Both loans became 
delinquent in May of 1969. There was also due and un-
paid to Carbon County property taxes and royalty pay. 
ments for the past several years in the approximate 
amount of $18,000 (Tr. 190-192-194); past due miners' 
wages in the amount of $9,000 (Tr. 193); past due pay-
ments to the Miners' Welfare Fund in the approximate 
amount of $1,800 (Tr. 137); and trade debts in an unde-
termined amount, one of which was for $3,500 (Tr. 137). 
Sabil Corporation contracted to purchase the Colombine 
stock on September 30, 1969 (Tr. 161-162), which stock 
was placed in escrow. Some time after September 20, 
1969, Sabil made written application through the Salt 
Lake office of SBA to assume these two loans. Sabi! Cor· 
poration was a closely-owned corporation headed by one 
William Reeves. The credit reports of William Reeves 
showed a poor rating and that he had no prior experience 
in mining (Tr. 70-71-72-73-169-170-171-190). The estab· 
lished policy at ARA was also that all requests to assume 
a loan and apply payments on past-due accounts must be 
in writing to the Washington, D.C. office, who had the 
sole authority to make these decisions (Tr. 226-229). The 
request to apply the insurance monies to the front end of 
the loan by Attorney Chester Abney for Bartek, Colom· 
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bine and Sabi! was never made to Washington, D.C., even 
though he was advised to do so (Tr. 126-151). 
Mr. William G. Smith testified that he was Chief of 
the Collateral Protection Division Office of Business De-
velopment Economic Development Administration in 
Washington, D.C., and that the accounting division, 
which serves the entire agency, follows the policy guid-
ance and direction of his Division concerning the account-
ing of all ARA loans (Tr. 45), and that he, Smith, per-
sonally directed that the records should reflect that the 
whole of the insurance monies should be applied to the 
principal of the ARA loan in the inverse order of matur-
ity (Tr. 49-50-51), which was the general policy of ap-
plying the monies received from such type of collateral 
(Tr. 56-57). The Government loans were never brought 
current by Sabil Corporation, nor did Sabil pay the past-
due county taxes, county royalties, miners' salaries, wel-
fare fund contributions, and current trade debts in the 
approximate amount of $35,000, nor would the applica-
tion of the insurance money on the front end of the ARA 
loan bring the said loan current. As admitted by counsel 
for appellants on Page 4 of their brief, both loans were in 
default at the time of acceleration, and, as a result, notices 
of default were given and the foreclosure action com-
menced, and the Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 13 of plain-
tiff's First Cause of Action were proper and sustained by 
all of the evidences submitted to and considered by the 
trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TERMS OF THE ARA LOAN NOTE AND TH! 
ASSIGNMENT OF THE DR. COLOMBO LIFE INSUR 
ANCE POLICY AS COLLATERAL FOR THE PAY 
MENT OF SAID NOTE AUTHORIZED THE APPLJ. 
CATION OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE LIFE IN 
SURANCE POLICY AS DIRECTED BY THE ARA 
AND THAT THE COURT'S FINDINGS NOS. 12 AND 
13 ARE IN ACCORD THEREWITH. 
The $325,000 ARA loan note, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
P-A, provides, in part, payee is authorized to declare all 
or any part of the indebtedness immediately due ano 
payable upon the happening of any of the following 
events: (1) Failure to pay any part of the indebtedness 
when due; (2) Non-performance by the undersigned of 
any agreement with, or any condition imposed by, payee 
with respect to the indebtedness; (6) The institution ol 
any suit affecting the undersigned deemed by payee to 
affect adversely its interest hereunder in the collateral 
or otherwise. Payee may apply the residue of the proceeds 
of any collateral to the payment of the indebtedness as 
it shall deem proper, returning the excess, if any, to the 
undersigned. 
Paragraph D of the assignment of life insurance pol· 
icy as collateral, Plaintiff's Exhibit Z-1, provides, in part, 
as follows: 
·db the It is expressly agreed that all sums receive Y 
assignee hereunder, either in the event of death ol 
the insured, the maturity or surrender of the pol· 
icy, the obtaining of a loan or advance on the 
6 
policy, or otherwise, shall first be applied to the 
payment of one or more of the following in such 
order of preference as the assignee shall determine: 
(a) principal of and/or interest on liabilities. 
The provisions 9f these two exhibits clearly afford 
the Government the rght to use its discretion in the appli-
cation of any monies received from the collateral given to 
secure the payment of the ARA note, Exhibit P-A, and 
the assignment of the insurance policy, Exhibit P-Z-1. 
The Government felt insecure with regards to the ARA 
loan, for the reason that the Colombine mine had never 
operated successfully; that the principal to whom the loan 
was made, namely, Dr. Colombo, had died; that the 
financial history of William Reeves of Sabil Corporation 
was such that the ARA concluded that he could not be 
relied upon to make payments on the loan as provided by 
the loan documents; that a lawsuit had been commenced 
with relation to the Colombine stock and that the said 
stock had been placed with the Commercial Security Bank 
under an escrow agreement, which provided for the pur-
chase of the Colombine stock by Sabil Corporation (Wil-
liam Reeves) and was conditioned, in part, that past due 
debts of Colombine, such as taxes, royalties, miners' sal-
aries, welfare fund contributions, and current trade debts 
be paid by Sabil, which conditions were not fulfilled, re-
sulting in the Collateral Protection Divison of the ARA 
deciding it was insecure with relation to the payment of 
its $325,000 loan with Colombine Coal and, based upon 
such decision and in accordance with the authority grant-
ed by the Exhibits P-A and P-Z-1, directed that all of the 
insurance monies be applied to the principal of said loan 
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in the inverse order of maturity, and further directed that 
notice of acceleration be given and an action commenced 
to foreclose its mortgage and other securities. 
Appellants, in their brief, contend that they had 
been assured that Dr. Colombo's insurance monies would 
be applied to the front end of the loan by certain Govern-
ment employees, and that the Statement of Account, un-
til changed by the order of Mr. William Smith of the 
ARA, showed that the insurance monies were so applied 
to appellants' account. 
It must be remembered that the Certified Statement 
of Account on the ARA loan, Plaintiff's Exhibit F-1, mere-
ly showed bookkeeping items as entered by bookkeeping 
personnel and remained so until the said account was sub-
mitted to Mr. Smith, who was the only person who had 
been delegated the final and sole authority to decide how 
the insurance money should be applied. 
Only authorized Government officials can bind the 
United States and Mr. Smith was the only one so auth· 
orized to make the decision here complained of. See Fed· 
eral Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 at page 
384-385, where the court stated: 
Whatever the form in which the Government 
functions, anyone entering into an arrangement 
with the Government takes the risk of having ac· 
curately ascertained that he who purports to a~t 
for the Government stays within the bounds of his 
authority. The scope of this authority may be ex· 
plicitly defined by Congress or be limited by dele· 
gated legislation, properly exercised through the 
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rule-making power. And this is so even though, 
as here, the agent himself may have been unaware 
of the limitations upon his authority. 
And he continues by saying: 
The oft-quoted observation in Rock Island, Ark-
ansas & Louisiana Railroad Co. v. United States, 
254 U.S. 141-143, that "Men must turn square 
corners when they deal with the Government," 
does not reflect a callous outlook. It merely ex-
presses the duty of all courts to observe the con-
dition defined by Congress for charging the public 
treasury. 
See also Utah Power & Light Company v. United 
States, 243 U.S. 389, at page 408-409. Also, Pine River 
Logging and Improvement Company v. United States, 
186 U.S. 279. 
In the case of Godine v. Liberty Shoe Company, a 
1967 Massachusetts case reported in 271 F. Supp. at page 
97, the court held that the insurance due under a life in-
surance policy assigned as collateral to secure the pay-
ment of an SBA loan could be applied immediately upon 
the principal of said loan in the inverse order of maturity, 
even though the payments of the loan on both principal 
and interest were current. The executors of the estate 
contended that the insurance proceeds should be held to 
pay any delinquencies that may occur in the future on the 
payment of both principal and interest, and if no delin-
quencies occurred that the proceeds from said life insur-
ance should be paid to the estate of the deceased upon the 
payment of the SBA loan in full. The court stated that the 
assignment of the insurance policies authorized the SBA 
9 
to apply the proceeds from such policies to the liabilities 
of the borrower in such order as the assignee (SBA) may 
determine proper. The court then stated: 
I find, therefore, that under the assignments of the 
policies in question, SBA had the right to apply 
the proceeds of the policies to the unmatured lia-
bilities of Liberty Shoe Company on the first loan; 
that there was no conversion of the funds. 
This decision was upheld by the appellate court as 
reported in 396 F.2d in the Footnote No. 3 on page 369, 
wherein the appellate court said that the district court 
correctly held that the SBA was authorized to apply in-
surance proceeds to the loan, whether or not Liberty Shoe 
Company was behind in its payments. 
POINT II. 
THE AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE INSURANCE 
MONEY RECEIVED UPON THE DEATH OF DR. 
COLOMBO TO THE $325,000 LOAN IN THE IN-
VERSE ORDER OF MATURITY MUST BE DETERM-
INED UNDER FEDERAL AND NOT STATE LAW. 
Respondent's position is that under Utah law it was 
acting within its authority pursuant to the terms of the 
ARA note and assignment of Dr. Colombo's insurance 
policy, Plaintiff's Exhibits P-A and Z-1, in applying the 
insurance money received to the principal of the said note 
in the inverse order of maturity, and, further, that no 
matter how the insurance money could have been applied, 
when received by the Government, to the payment of the 
delinquent instalments of interest and principal and out· 
10 
standing obligations of Colombine Coal Company, the 
ARA note under its terms would still have been in de-
fault. 
In the alternative, the law is well settled that if there 
is a conflict between federal and state laws in this type of 
foreclosure action the federal law shall prevail over the 
laws of the several states. 
Congress by law created the Small Business Admin-
istration, and defines its powers in Title 15, U.S.C.A. Sec-
tions 634 and 636. 
Section 636(a) authorizes the making of loans to 
small business concerns, and Section 636(a)(7) provides 
that all loans made under this subsection shall be of such 
sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repay-
ment, which delegates to the Small Business Administra-
tion the use of its discretion in what loans shall be made 
and how they shall be secured. These loans are made 
nationwide through field offices located in various cities 
of the United States, with the final decisions to be made in 
the main office located in Washington, D.C. 
In functioning within its delegated power, the fed-
eral court decisions hold that the operation of such a gov-
ernmental agency cannot be restricted or required to com-
ply with state law or state court decisions with relation 
to the making and servicing of this type of loan. 
In United States v. Allegheny County, reported in 
322 U.S. 174 at page 182, the court states: 
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Procurement policies so settled under federal auth-
ority may not be defeated or limited by state law. 
The purpose of the supremacy clause was to avoid 
the introduction of disparities, confusions and con-
flicts which would follow if the Government's 
general authority were subject to local controls. 
The validity and construction of contracts through 
which the United States is exercising its consti-
tutional .function, their consequences on the rights 
and oblgations of the parties, the titles or liens 
which they create or permit, all present questions 
of federal law not controlled by the law of any 
State. 
Citing many cases sustaining this position further, 
see Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. at page 363 at 
page 367: 
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we 
have occasionally selected state law. See Royal In-
demnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289. But 
reasons which may make state law at times the 
appropriate federal rule are singularly inappropri-
ate here. The issuance of commercial paper by the 
United States is on a vast scale and transactions in 
that paper from issuance to payment will com-
monly occur in several states. The application of 
state law, even without the conflict of laws rules 
of the forum, would subject the rights and duties 
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. 
It would lead to great diversity in results by mak-
ing identical transactions subject to the vagaries 
of the laws of the several states. The desirability 
of a uniform rule is plain. 
In the case of United States v. View Crest Garden 
Apartments, Inc., a 1959 Ninth Circuit case, 268 F.2d 
381, page 383, the appellate court reversed the trial court 
that held that under Washington State law the Govern-
12 
ment was not entitled to have a receiver appointed, and 
the appellate court stated: 
After a default the sole situation presented is one 
of remedies. Commercial convenience in utilizing 
local forms and recording devices familiar to the 
community is no longer a significant factor. Now 
the federal policy to protect the treasury and to 
promote the security of federal investment which 
in turn promotes the prime purpose of the Act -
to facilitate the building of homes by the use of 
federal credit - becomes predominant. Local 
rules limiting the effectiveness of the remedies 
available to the United States for breach of a fed-
eral duty cannot be adopted. It is urged that to 
hold that federal law applies would result in great 
hardship to the mortgagors who would thereby be 
deprived of all rights under state law such as the 
right of redemption. We do not think that such a 
conclusion necessarily follows. 
In the case of United States v. John E. Wells, a 1968 
Fifth Circuit case, 403 F.2d 596, at page 597, the court 
stated, with relation to whether or not a deficiency judg-
ment could be entered on a mortgage foreclosure which 
was not permitted by state law: 
We hold that federal law does apply in such situ-
ations. The national loan program of the Veterans 
Administration cannot be subjected to the vaga-
ries of the various state laws which might other-
wise control all or some phases of the loan pro-
gram. 
See Director of Revenue, State of Colorado vs. United 
States, a 1968 Tenth Circuit case reported in 392 F.2d 
307, involving the foreclosure of an SBA security agree-
ment, the court holding that even though the SBA law 
13 
"does not provide for primacy of the state liens, the Colo-
rado statutes do so provide. It is conceded that federal 
law controls the relative rights of an instrumentality of 
the federal government," citing other cases. 
In the case of Cassidy Commission Company v. United 
States, a 1967 Tenth Circuit case, 387 F.2d 875, which 
was a case to determine the liability of a commission mer-
chant in auctioning cattle which were covered by a Farm-
ers Home Administration security agreement, the court 
Stated: 
The making of the loans and the taking of the se-
curity therefor were the exercise by the federal 
government of a grant of constitutional power. 
The power of the United States to protect its purse 
from potential injury is clear. A uniform federal 
rule is essential to protect the security interests of 
the United States and to prevent such interests 
from being detrimentally affected through the un-
certainty that would arise from the application 
of disparate state rules. 
In the case of United States v. Sommerville, a 1964 
case, 324 F.2d 718, a Third Circuit case involving the lia-
bility of auctioneers selling livestock subject to a security 
agreement, the court stated that the question was as to 
whether liability is governed by state or federal law, and 
held: 
Decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, and 
other courts all demonstrate that federal law is ap-
plicable in the case at bar. An independent federal 
rule of decision must be applied when a genuine 
federal interest would be subjected to uncertainty 
by application of disparate state rules. 
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In the case of United States v. Stadium Gardens, 
Ninth Circuit Case 425 F.2d 358, the court held that 
under a federal mortgage foreclosure there would be no 
right of redemption, even though Idaho law provided 
therefor. 
For cases holding that a deficiency judgment in a 
foreclosure action is controlled by federal, rather than 
state, law, see Herlong Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United 
States, 358 F.2d 300 (C.A. 9); United States v. Walker 
Park Realty Inc., 383 F.2d 732 (C.A. 2); United States 
v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (C.A. 5). 
In any event, the facts clearly show that both the 
ARA and SBA loans were in default when the notice 6f 
acceleration was given and the foreclosure action com-
menced, which default could not be cured by a later 
change in bookkeeping entries. 
Counsel for appellant in open court admitted the 
loans were in default, and the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, in the case of Commercial Se-
curity Bank v. Walker Bank and Trust Company, Admin-
istrator of the Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Deceased, et 
al, USDC D-Utah No. C-336-70, which was an action in-
volving two groups claiming ownership to the stock of 
the Colombine Coal Company, found, upon motion made 
by the attorney for the appellants here, in part as follows: 
Finding No. 7. The Reeves Group has failed to 
comply with the provisions of the Agreement re-
quiring them to pay the loans made by the Small 
Business Administration and the Area Develop-
ment administration to Colombine Coal Company. 
15 
As a result thereof, the United States of America 
brought an action in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (Case No. 194420) whereby 
said court found that because of a default in pay-
ment to the United States of America there was due 
and owing the sums of $226,106.31, together with 
daily interest thereon of $22.8146 from February 
11, 1971 until paid, and $70,764, together with 
daily interest thereon of $9.751569 from February 
11, 1971 until paid. 
It must, therefore, be concluded that the application 
of federal law with relation to the servicing of small busi-
ness loans by the SBA grants to it discretionary power in 
the loaning of funds, in the security required for such 
loans, and the collection thereof. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE MAKING AND SERVICING OF LOANS 
BY THE SBA IS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 
701, it is provided, in part, as follows: 
(a) This chapter applies according to the pro-
visions thereof except to the extent that 
( 1) Statutes preclude judicial review, or 
(2) Agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law. 
The court, in interpreting these sections with relation 
to the Small Business Administration in Lusch v. Hoff-
master, 253 F. Supp. 633, at page 635, states as follows: 
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More importantly perhaps plaintiff's argument 
overlooks the second exception to the introduction 
of 5 U.S.C.A. 1009, now 701, cases where "agencv 
action is by law committed to agency discretion.;, 
Congress has committed to the discretion of the 
Small Business Administrator what loans shall be 
made and how they shall be secured. See gener-
ally the provisions of 15 U.S.C.A. 636(a), partic-
ularly paragraph (7) thereof. The courts have 
consistently given effect to the provision except-
ing from the ambit of 5 U.S.C.A. 1009, now 701, 
"agency action that it by law committed to agency 
discretion," 
quoting several cases, and concludes by saying: 
It is so clear that the terms and conditions of loans 
under 15 U.S.C.A. 636(a) fall within that excep-
tion that the proposition has apparently never 
been challenged in the courts. 
In the case of Udall v. Freeman, 336 F.2d 706, the 
question arose as to whether or not the Secretary of In-
terior had to accept a bid for the sale of public lands aftet 
the same had been advertised for sale. The court held 
that the Secretary of Interior in his discretion may refuse 
for whatever reason he finds adequate to sell lands as to 
which the Secretary had invited bidding, and further 
stated that the Secretary's refusal to issue a Certificate of 
Sale is not subject to judicial review. The court further 
stated that: 
Since Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures 
Act, now 5 U.S.C. 701, "by law committed to 
agency discretion such decision, we are without 
power to review the Secretary's decision in this 
case," and concluded by saying that, "The ?eces-
sary implication is that courts may not review a 
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decision committed to the Secretary's discretion 
pursuant to a permissive type statute." 
In the case of Kiss v. Fogliani, 388 F.2d 381, a 1968 
case, the question arose as to whether or not a decision 
made by the Secretary of Labor with relation to claims 
of employees involving federal grants in aid were re· 
viewable, and the court stated: 
Assuming standing to sue, the scope of permissible 
review is limited. A mere difference of judgment 
between a person disadvantageously affected by 
agency action and the responsible head of the 
agency over the merits of particular administrative 
action as a means of achieving a legislative objec-
tive, when Congress has assigned authority to 
make and act upon such determination to the 
agency, is not judicially reviewable. 
And then stated that: 
The Administrative Procedures Act expressly ex· 
eludes agency action by law committed to agency 
discretion from judicial review. 
In the case of Panama Canal v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 
U.S. 309, at page 317, the court, in referring to the Ad· 
ministrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 1009, now 5 U.S.C. 
701, holds that the said section: 
Excludes from the categories of cases subject to 
judicial review "agency action" that is "by law 
committed to agency discretion." We think the 
inifation of a proceed'llg for readjustment of the 
tolls of the Panama Canal is a matter that Coug-
ress has left to the discretion of the Panama Canal 
Company. Petitioner is, as we have seen, an agent 
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or spokesman of the President in these matters. It 
is "authorized" to prescribe tolls and to change 
them. But the exercise of that authority is far 
more than the performance of a ministerial act. 
As we have seen, the present conflict rages over 
questions that at heart involve problems of statu-
tory construction and cost accounting: whether an 
operating deficit in the auxiliary or supporting ac-
tivities is a legitimate cost in maintaining and 
operating the Canal for purpose of the toll form-
ula. These are matters on which experts may dis-
agree; they involve nice issues of judgment and 
choice, which require the exercise of informed dis-
creion. 
From the foregoing cases it is quite apparent that 
the Administrator of the Small Business Administration 
has been granted authority to make loans to small com-
panies needing assistance, but he is further required to see 
that said loans are secured by proper security and is given 
discretion in making the decision as to whether said loans 
should be made; also as to what security should be re-
quired, and under what conditions collections and neces-
sary legal action shall be taken for the collection of said 
loans. The exercise of his discretion in making said de-
cisions is not reviewable in a court of law; and his de-
cisions thereon are final. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony at the trial of this action clearly shows 
that Colombine Coal Company never operated at a profit 
and was harassed by poor management and lack of suffic· 
ient operating capital; that after Dr. Colombo's death, 
disputes arose as to the stock of said company, resulting 
in lawsuits being filed; that much time elapsed from the 
death of Dr. Colombo until the Government received pay· 
ment of the insurance funds, and more time elapsed in 
giving consideration to the requests for the reinstatement 
and assumption of the loans by the new purchasers of 
Colombine Coal Company stock, namely, Sabi! Corpor-
ation; that under the terms of the ARA note, and the as-
signment of the insurance policy as collateral for the pay-
ment thereof, the ARA was legally authorized to apply 
the insurance monies, as is shown upon the Certified 
Statement of Account, Plaintiff's Exhibit F-1. ARA was 
further authorized under the discretionary powers dele-
gated to it by Congress to apply the insurance monies to 
the loan in the inverse order of maturity, as also shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit F-1. The evidence clearly shows that 
even though the insurance monies, when received, had 
been applied to the interest and instalment payments then 
past due, the ARA loan of $325,000 would have still 
been delinquent. This is without taking into account that 
appellants were also in default under the terms of 
the note, Plaintiff's Exhibit P-1, in that they were, and had 
long been, indebted to Carbon County for taxes, royalty 
payments under the land leases, miners' wages, Miners' 
Welfare Fund, and trade debts, all in the approximate 
amount of $35,000. 
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This court must, therefore, conclude that, at the time 
the notices of acceleration were given to appellants, the 
ARA loan of $325,000 was in default and the trial cou!f 
properly made and entered its Findings 12 and 13 on the 
First Cause of Action and its Decree of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale of both Real and Personal Property given 
to secure the payment of said ARA loan. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. NELSON DAY, 
United States Attorney 
By 
A. Pratt Kesler 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff· 
Respondent 
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